Mutual Aid and Mobile Reserve Division.

3. ORGANIZING AGAINST A-BOMB ATTACK

If Chicago's mayor were not on speaking terms with the mayors of Gary and East Chicago, Milwaukee, and all the cities of downstate Illinois -- Chicago would be in a bad way should A-bombs fall on it. And the nation would be in a bad way too.

The primary purpose of an A-bomb attack has two parts: To knock out such vital installations as factories, communications centers, supply depots and the people who run them; and to knock out the resources, facilities and people who could put them back into working order.

If Chicago could not depend on its surrounding communities for fire engines, water, doctors and medical supplies, emergency hospitals for casualties, rest camps for the homeless, rescue workers, Chicago would be a lifeless city after an A-bomb attack.

But if, under a well-set up organization and with plans properly worked out beforehand, the necessary -- and only the necessary -- aid is rushed into Chicago after such an attack, the dead and wounded would be much fewer, the extent of the damage from fire would be much less, and the ability of the city to recuperate -- to get going again on the war effort -- would be much greater.

Thus civil defense requires a great deal of organizing and planning -- nationally, statewise and locally.

An organization grows and changes when it is put to use. We may count on it that if we never have to use it, we will never have a perfect civil defense organization. Right now we have only theories, based on our untried civil defense organization of World War II and on the tried and tested British counterpart.

The American system of civil defense.

Paul J. Larsen, who is director of the Civilian Mobilization office of the National Security Resources Board -- the agency responsible to the President for civil defense plans -- puts the concept of American civil defense this way:

"Where do you start, in tackling this serious problem of modern civil defense planning for your cities?

"Fortunately, the natural line of responsibility and authority with which we are favored in this democracy is the basic pattern for civil defense action in time of war. The prime mover is the individual citizen. Then in natural succession comes your local municipal government, then the state government and finally the Federal government.

"Here is a graphic outline of how this natural system of ours should operate in civil defense:

"l. THE INDIVIDUAL, calm and well-trained as possible does everything within his power to help himself and those around him.

"2. THE FAMILY, seeking self-preservation, operates as a unit in handling its own problems as far as it honestly can.

"3. THE COMMUNITY, well-organized and equipped in advance, puts its Civil Defense organization to work instantly to meet the crisis.

"4. NEARBY CITIES come to the community's assistance with mutual aid and mobile reserves, when they are needed.

"5. THE STATE stands ready to furnish its organized assistance if the situation gets beyond local control.

"6. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT has its resources in readiness to answer the state's call for large scale help.

"7. MILITARY AID, both state and national, and to the extent available comes to the assistance of the civil authorities ONLY after all other civilian facilities are exhausted."

This is the pattern, both for the planning states, and for the 'operating organization, if and when we need it.

THE NATIONAL DIRECTOR

Starting from the top down, there will be a Federal Director of civil defense.

The national government is operating on the theory that the less power this official has, the better; the more that can be done by states and cities within themselves and in cooperation with each other, the better.

However, experience in Britain shows that, as the bombing attacks increased, the control from the top had to be tighter, the directions more specific. Britain even consolidated all her local fire departments into a national fire service so they could be sent to where they would do the most good for the national war effort.

So the pattern looks like this. In the planning stages of civil defense, the national director will be more of a coordinator than a director. He will achieve liaison between the various government departments, civilian and military, on civil defense problems. He will forward plans and advice to the states and, through them, to local governments. He will urge them to pass the necessary legislation, to conduct the necessary training courses, to set up the necessary staffs.

If and when an all-out war starts, the nation will probably find it advisable to give him more power. He will then be able to direct cities which have lagged behind in civil defense planning to come up to date. He will be able to order mutual aid pacts. But the main responsibility will still lie within the states.

If and when A-bombs begin to drop, the national director's power will increase. If A-bombs fall on both Philadelphia and Camden, just across the river in New Jersey, a mutual aid pact between the cities might fall down -- both wanting to keep all their fire equipment, all their doctors, all their rescue workers.

Suggested model for state organization of civil defense.

Someone must look at such an attack on two cities separated by a state border from the national interest. Should Philadelphia firemen abandon a row of apartment houses in their home town and go to a factory in Camden? Someone must have the position to decide and the power to direct such activities.

This person may, of course, be a regional director responsible to the national director.

Most states already have full time civil defense directors. They are responsible for more detailed plans and operations than is the national director, but, like him, they are still on the level of giving advice, coordinating the plans and operations of local communities. They will draw up and submit to legislatures mutual aid agreements between states. They will be responsible to see that the personnel trained under the national civil defense plan in radiation detection and other subjects pass on their training to men and women in the cities.

THE COMMUNITY DIRECTOR

Every city with more than 50,000 population may and should consider itself a potential target.

It is in the communities where details of organization become more complex, where plans and advice from above are translated into realities. Your city director must survey your community and, based on the knowledge he gains thereby and the knowledge he receives from state and federal civil defense officials, he must work out detailed organization, recruit the right people and secure adequate equipment to take care of any attack.

Every city in this country with more than 50,000 population can and should consider itself a potential target for A-bombs. Every town and city within 200 miles, at least, of any potential targets should consider that all its resources, from its hospital and fire department to Mrs. Jones' spare bedroom, may be mobilized to aid a stricken area.

The civilian defense director might well take the approach of Brigadier General Gordon Young, engineer commissioner of the District of Columbia. This is to assume that a national emergency has been declared, assume that one or more A-bombs have dropped near the center of his city. What should the factories, the hospitals, the government agencies, the police and fire departments, the public utilities, the communications facilities and the individual citizens have done before the A-bombs were dropped? What must they be prepared to do during and after the attack?

The lines of his organization will be suggested to him from the federal government. At the start he will need few full time workers, a few more part time workers and many volunteers. The kinds of jobs he will have to organize into a smoothly running organization, ready to be mobilized in an instant, are outlined in Chapter 2.

He will have to see to it that the vital parts of the community's body are well prepared. A start in this direction is contained in the following questionnaire, which General Young asked the organizations in Washington to fill out.

Name of Individual, and Organization or Function: ....................................

Report(s) already submitted: ....................................

Assume that a National Emergency is declared, and Washington is warned that it may be bombed or otherwise attacked on short notice. The District Commissioners are given emergency powers and ample money. An Air Raid Warning system is already functioning. You are to assume that any threatened air raid will be detected at least one hour in advance, and that the city will be warned by an "alert." Upon such an alert certain precautions may be taken, but no part of the city will be evacuated.

As soon as such an assumed emergency was declared, you would have a threefold job facing you: (I) To put your organization into a permanent state of preparedness for condition of emergency which the city and nation are entering (which includes anti-sabotage precautions). (II) To decide what to do, if an air raid alert is sounded. (III) To decide what to do immediately after a raid, if one occurs and the city is bombed.

If you are uncertain about an answer, give your best guess. What will emerge from this study will still be a very tentative and imperfect document. It will be studied carefully by the National Security Resources Board; and you will have full opportunity to assist in perfecting it. Therefore, nothing you may say or write down now is in any sense a final commitment.

1. Additional Personnel. Would you need any additions to your personnel? If so:

a. About how many and what kind?
b. Would they be needed to strengthen existing units, or to create new emergency units; if the latter, what units?
c. Would you prefer to (1) recruit them yourself, and (2) to train them yourself, or would you like outside assistance in recruiting or training?

NOTE: In answering the above, allow for the fact that some of your regular personnel may be casualties in an attack, and you may want to recruit and train replacements for them in advance. Also allow for the fact that, following an attack, you may need to make emergency repairs to your installations on a large scale and in a hurry, and may want an enlarged force to do it.

2. Alternative Executives. What plans, in general terms, would you make for "Number Two Men" to replace key executives and others following an attack, if the regular ones were incapacitated?

3. Additional Equipment, Transportation and Supplies. Would you need to lay in any additions to your present stock? If so:

a. State what is needed, in whatever detail time permits. A list of at least the larger and more expensive items, or those hard to procure, would be helpful.
b. To what extent could you get them locally?
c. Would you need any financial or other assistance in obtaining them? (In the case of City Departments, assume that ample funds were available; but the availability of items for prompt purchase, and conflicting demands, must be considered.)

NOTE: Here again, you should allow in your planning for possible destruction of some of your existing stocks in an attack; and also for the need of emergency repairs after an attack.

4. Dispersed Storage. Would you establish dispersed storage depots or dumps, away from the center of the city, for any equipment, transportation or supplies? If so, where; and what in general would be stored? (Indicate any actually existing storage of the sort. If confidential, omit details.)

5. Space or Facilities for New Activities. Is there any housing, storage, office space or other covered or open space, which you would need to obtain, or to have earmarked for you in advance, for use during an alert or after an attack? Indicate in as much detail as possible what, how much, where, and what equipment, supplies and special installations would be involved.

NOTE: The outstanding examples of this are (1) space which the Emergency Disaster agency (a part of the Civil Defense organization) would need to house and feed refugees; and (2) space needed by the Medical organization for caring for casualties (including first-aid stations), pending the time when they could be sent to regular hospitals or evacuated from the city. There may be other cases of this sort in other agencies.

6. Safeguarding of Documents.

a. Are there any documents, files, drawings, etc. which you would desire and be able to send at once to a point away from the center of the city? (Yes or No, no details needed.)
b. If so, have you (actually, today) a suitable place where you could send them? (Yes or No.)
c. Are there others which you could not send at once, but would wish to microfilm or otherwise reproduce for that purpose? If "Yes," would it mean a large-scale, a medium scale or a smallscale job of reproduction?

7. Other Dispersion Preceding an Alert. Are there any offices, shops, or other key installations or localized activities in central and exposed areas of the city, which you would move at once to less exposed locations; or, for which you would prepare, in advance, alternative locations, where the activity could be set up on short notice following an alert or a bombing? If so, give whatever details you can, including the new locations if you are prepared to select them or to make a guess about their location.

8. Protective Construction.

a. Would you at once undertake any protective construction to minimize possible loss of life to your personnel on duty during an attack, and to minimize possible damage to key installations? If so, give whatever details you can.
b. Would you need outside assistance (money, men or material) for the purpose? Specify.
c. Would you need outside guidance as to suitable types of protective construction? Specify.

NOTE: The foregoing does not apply to anti-sabotage precautions, but primarily to emergency construction designed to give some degree of protection from bombing or from widespread fires following a bombing.

9. Sabotage.

a. Have you (actually, today) an adequate anti-sabotage plan? (Yes or No.)
b. If so, would it be available on request to the proper District authorities, for study?
c. Would you need any outside assistance (men, weapons, equipment or supplies), to put it into full effect? (If confidential, answer at your discretion.)

10. Supplemental Communications.

a. Would you need to supplement your present communications (telephone, teletype, fixed or mobile radio, etc.)? If so, give whatever details you can.
b. Would you need outside assistance (money, men, materiel, or action by other agencies) for the purpose? Specify.
c. Have you checked any proposed use of radio with the Superintendent of Communications, D. C., to assure yourself that it would fit into the overall Emergency Plan?

11. Passes. Are there any categories of your personnel who should be provided with passes and identifications, entitling them to move freely about the city during an alert or following an attack (when normal movement may be restricted by the police)?

12. Publicity.

a. Following a Declaration of Emergency, is there any information you would wish to have presented to the public, to make your task easier or to assist the public? Specify in general terms.
b. Would you wish to utilize commercial radio for the purpose, and to what extent?
c. If the District Commissioners prepared, and periodically issued by newspaper or radio, "canned releases" to the public, is it likely that your material, or any of it, could best be incorporated in them?

13. Drills, Etc. Would you need or desire to participate in any city-wide drills, "practice runs," etc. (e.g., practice blackouts, practice alerts), and have you any comments or suggestions in this field?

14. Other Communities. Would you need to coordinate your emergency activities with those of adjoining cities and communities, and have you any thoughts about how this could best be accomplished?

15. Other Organizations. Same question, as regards other organizations or agencies within the District.

16. Effect on Normal Activities. Generally speaking, after a Declaration of Emergency and in the absence of any specific alert or warning, would the policy of your agency be "business as usual," or would there be any important restrictions or changes in your normal peace-time activities? Give any details you can.

17. Mobilization of Personnel.

a. What personnel, not on duty, would be immediately mobilized; and where? (Included both regular forces and any pre-arranged reserves.)
b. How would you get word to them to mobilize? (Among the possibilities are: (1) A radio signal broadcast; (2) Special calls, by telephone or other; (3) An advance understanding of what the personnel would do on hearing an alert.)

18. Mobilization and/or Dispersion of Transportation and Mobile Equipment.

Same questions as in (17) above. Give consideration to any equipment, or group of men, that you would wish to move out from the center of the city during the period of the "alert," so that they would be safer during a bombing, and therefore available immediately after a bombing to make repairs, restore service, open alternative centers of activity, or perform other essential tasks.

19. Sabotage. Would you need any immediate strengthening of the anti-sabotage measures already taken, to allow for the conditions of an air attack? (If confidential, so state.)

20. Publicity. Is there any information, pertaining to your agency, that you would wish to have included in any "canned releases" that the Commissioners would give out to the public during an alert (probably by radio)? Specify.

21. What advance plans would you make, as to what your agency would do immediately after one or more bombs had been dropped on Washington? Give whatever details you can.

NOTE: There is no way of telling in advance where the bombs might fall, what damage they might do, or how much of your own force and installations might be knocked out. You can only guess that the bombing would most probably be somewhere in the central part of the city.

22. Are there any additional assumptions, information or data, which you have not been given, and which you will need before you can prepare a final and permanent Emergency Plan?

23. Any comments, criticisms or suggestions on any aspects of the subject would be welcome, either enlarging on the above items or on other items which we have overlooked.

GORDON R. YOUNG
Brigadier General, U. S. Army Engineer Commissioner

There are some questions here which are applicable to almost all business and even to homes.

In Britain, wardens were laughed at before the bombs fell. In this country during World War II many people looked on some wardens as busybodies, officious and largely unnecessary. When the bombs dropped in Britain, the homes became the front lines and the warden became the man who knew how to direct the battle of the hearthside.

We were not attacked from the air during World War II. We may be this time. The civil defense director is responsible for his wardens being properly deployed, being properly trained and that there are enough of them.

He must, through his city government, make mutual aid pacts with other cities, secure promises of help from suburbs and gear what outside help will be available into his plans.

This home army of civilians upon all of us must depend if and when an A-bomb falls is not purely defensive. If we are in an all-out war, we will be expecting our armed forces to be carrying the fight to the enemy. They will depend on us to keep the supplies coming to them, to protect their loved ones, to keep democracy alive at home. We must be prepared, with an efficient defense organization to do that job.